The End of Peace?

by Giorgio Shani

The 2012 Lower House elections may turn out to be a pivotal moment in modern post-war Japanese political history. Unlike previous elections that have resulted in overwhelming victories for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the changed political landscape post-3/11 has led to the eclipse of the traditional centrist opposition represented by the outgoing Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ lost two-thirds of its seats, was hammered in Fukushima where it carried the can for its handling of the nuclear crisis and only won three more seats than the Japanese Restoration (Nihon Ishin) party—a party that did not exist until earlier this year. The emergence of the newly formed Japanese Restoration party led by “revisionist” nationalists, former Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara and Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto, raises the specter of a return to militarism.

Like the LDP under Prime Minister-elect Shinzo Abe, the Restoration party is in favor of a revision of Japan’s Peace Constitution and its “restoration” to great power status in North-East Asia. The Restoration party is likely to support Prime Minister Abe in his attempt to revise Article 96 of the constitution, which requires that any constitutional amendments need a two-thirds majority of both chambers and, subsequently, will support the anticipated revision of Article 9 of the constitution under which Japan forever “renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”

The two parties differ, however, in their approach to domestic issues. The Restoration Party’s populist appeal may prove distasteful to the aristocratic Prime Minister-elect Abe whose grandfather, Nobuske Kishi, was a post-war Prime Minister. While the jury is still out on whether the Restoration party will become a conservative opposition or a new long-term coalition partner for a party that likes to consider itself as Japan’s natural rulers, in the short-term the LDP will seek to form a government with their traditional coalition partners, the Buddhist “pacifist” New Komeito party. The New Komeito also benefited from the collapse of the DPJ gaining 10 seats (31 overall), which gives the two parties 325 out of 480 seats in the Lower House—in excess of the two-thirds majority needed to override most decisions in the Upper House. Both appear to share similar Keynesian economic policies, rather than the neo-liberalism favored by the Japan Restoration party.

The 2013 Upper House elections could see a fundamental realignment of Japanese politics towards the right if the LDP repeat their landslide victory and the Restoration Party wins more seats than the DPJ. If so, intra-party competition may lead not only to the revision of Article 9 of the constitution, but also to an increasingly assertive foreign policy in a highly militarized and volatile region. This could cause global repercussions that reverberate far beyond the Senkaku Islands, and threaten peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Nuclear By Default

by Glen Clancy

The first explosion at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant sent shock waves of vulnerability throughout Japan. Now, there is a lingering anxiety in the air: no one dares to talk about it, but everyone knows it’s there. Yet one year after Japan was propelled into its worst post-war crisis, the party that devised, facilitated and constructed a nuclear-dependent Japan has won back government in a landslide victory.

Politics can be a confusing beast—not least in a country that has seen six prime ministers in five years and where party factions are often greater adversaries than opposition parties.

But why was the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) voted back so soon after Fukushima, a disaster for which it bears largest responsibility?

One clue may lie in the fact that this was the lowest voter turnout since WW2, suggesting mass disillusionment among the Japanese population. “In the single-seat constituency system (accounting for 300 of the 480 seats) only parties with highly organized power and reach can win government,” says a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) official.

This single-seat constituency system, as opposed to a proportional representation system, encourages citizens to vote for a major political party, i.e. one that has a “chance” of winning outright—otherwise they may believe their vote has been “wasted.”

Of the two major parties, the LDP supported nuclear power while the DPJ had a vague outline for phasing it out by the 2030s—a plan that would be difficult to effect given the fragility of the party leadership.

Given these alternatives it stands to reason the Japanese citizens who displayed the will to vote turned to other issues—for example the economy and security.
“The economy was the most important issue for me,” said one voter. Another highlighted “the increase in taxes. Japan is in a lot of debt and unless we do something about it now we will be leaving a huge burden for our children.”

Furthermore, an Asahi Shimbun exit poll demonstrated a trend among anti-nuclear voters, of spreading their vote evenly across all political parties. Perhaps this lack of unity amongst anti-nuclear voters contributed to the LDP’s landslide victory.

“This election was more about trust than policy,” says the DPJ official. “The DPJ’s lack of coordination was damaging. We couldn’t implement what we promised and were perceived as unreliable.”

The Japanese had a choice between the incumbent party in disarray with little capacity to implement policy versus a political party that set up a nuclear-reliant nation and is closely tied to the struggling economy that has ruled the country since WW2.

The landslide LDP victory points more toward an indictment of the DPJ’s past three years in power, than faith in the effectiveness of a LDP government led by Shinzo Abe, a man who lasted but one year last time in the nation’s top job.